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ABSTRACT
The European Commission has repeatedly emphasized that the results of ex post
legislative (EPL) evaluations should be used to improve the quality of its
legislative proposals. This article aims to explain the variation in such
instrumental use of EPL evaluations by the Commission. Three high-quality
EPL evaluations with varying levels of use were studied in-depth to assess the
influence of political factors on evaluation use. The results show that, contrary
to expectations, EPL evaluations may be used instrumentally even if their
recommendations are opposed by important political actors in the legislative
process. This article also shows that a lack of salience of the policy field to
which an EPL evaluation belongs in the eyes of the Commission could, in
combination with the institution’s ambition to reduce its legislative output, be
a sufficient condition for the non-use of that evaluation.
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Introduction
In its official communications, the European Commission (2015: 7, 2016: 2) has
repeatedly promoted the idea of evidence-based policy: policy decisions
should be based on objective information whenever possible. One important
source of such information is ex post legislative (EPL) evaluations: reports that
retrospectively assess the functioning of European legislation (European Com-
mission 2015: 253). Ideally, EPL evaluations generate knowledge that allows
the Commission to make informed decisions about legislative amendments
(European Commission 2015: 254; Fitzpatrick 2012: 479). In both the academic
literature and this article, such use of evaluations to make informed decisions
about policy improvement is labelled instrumental use (Cousins and Leith-
wood 1986: 346).1
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Various academics have discussed to what extent the Commission uses evi-
dence instrumentally in practice. Whereas some research reveals that the
Commission often uses scientific evidence to improve legislative proposals
(e.g., Rimkuté and Haverland 2015: 433), other studies have shown that its
instrumental use of evaluations is limited due to its politicized environment
and because of technical constraints (e.g., Böhling 2014: 118; Boswell 2008;
Højlund 2014; Torriti 2010: 1078). Until now, such empirical research about
the Commission’s use of evaluations has focused on programme evaluations
(e.g., De Laat and Williams 2014; Højlund 2014) and ex-ante legislative evalu-
ations (e.g., Radaelli 2007; Torriti 2010). Conversely, the Commission’s EPL
evaluations have rarely been studied (but see Fitzpatrick 2012; Mastenbroek
et al. 2016; Zwaan et al. 2016). Therefore, little is known about what factors
affect the Commission’s use EPL evaluations.
This omission is unfortunate for two reasons. Firstly, due to its lack of finan-
cial and communicative tools, legislation is the Commission’s main policy
instrument (Lodge 2008: 282). This makes it important to study if and how
the Commission’s legislative proposals are influenced by sources of knowl-
edge like EPL evaluations. Secondly, EPL evaluations tend to receive more
attention from politicians than evaluations of other policies, since legislation
affects the entire public and is usually discussed in parliament (Zwaan et al.
2016: 688). In theory, this makes it likely for the instrumental use of EPL evalu-
ations to be affected by political conditions. For these reasons, this article
answers the following research question: ‘to what extent and how do political
conditions affect the European Commission’s instrumental use of EPL
evaluations?’
By answering this question, this article contributes to the ongoing debate
about the Commission’s nature. Originally, the Commission was perceived as
a technocratic institution, aimed at impartial problem-solving (Wille 2010:
1098). Nowadays, the Commission is perceived as (also) a political actor that
pursues its own preferences and acts strategically (Hartlapp et al. 2014: 1;
Wille 2010: 1100). This political perspective on the Commission can be
linked to a political view on evaluation use (e.g., Contandriopoulos and Brous-
selle 2012: 63–4; Cousins and Leithwood 1986: 347; Johnson et al. 2009: 379;
Weiss 1993: 95–103). Based on these views, it can be expected that necessary
conditions for the Commission’s use of EPL evaluations are that they do not
contradict the preferences of the policy-makers, veto players or interest
groups involved in the European legislative process.
To test these expectations, we conducted an in-depth analysis of three EPL
evaluations with varying levels of instrumental use. Extensive document
analysis and nineteen in-depth interviews with various actors were used to
collect data about the impact of various political conditions on the Commis-
sion’s use of EPL evaluations. Technical explanations for evaluation use were
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controlled for, which allowed us to better study the impact of these political
conditions.
Contrary to our expectations, our results show that the absence of political
opposition to specific evaluation results is not a necessary condition for use.
Instead, we found a lack of salience of the evaluated policy field, combined
with a commitment to limit legislative output, to be a sufficient condition for
non-use. If the Commission’s political top does not prioritize a policy field, it
is unlikely to follow-up on recommendations from EPL evaluations that
require new legislative initiatives.
Theoretical framework
Political explanations
Since the 1970s, the evaluation literature has increasingly discussed how pol-
itical conditions, next to technical ones, affect evaluation use (Johnson et al.
2009: 385). This literature generally argues that evaluation use is inherently
political, as evaluations allocate praise or blame and may result in policy
changes. Actors who feel threatened by evaluations may therefore try to
prevent their use or to selectively use those results that fit their agenda
(Lederman 2012: 162; Weiss 1993: 95–8).
The literature discusses several specific political conditions that affect
instrumental evaluation use. A first condition is policy-makers’ preferences
(Lederman 2012: 162; Weiss 1993: 97–8), with preferences being defined as
actors’ beliefs about the feasibility and/or appropriateness of policies
(Bunea 2013). Even when an evaluation recommends certain policy
changes, policy-makers may oppose these changes on moral grounds
(Weiss 1993: 97–8) or because they doubt their feasibility. Evaluations are
often unable to change such deeply rooted policy beliefs and may therefore
remain unused (Weiss 1993: 97–8).
The literature also shows that the political–institutional context of an evalu-
ation affects its use (Cousins and Leithwood 1986: 354–5; Shulha and Cousins
1997: 196). Evaluation results are only one type of input that affects decisions
about evaluation use: policy-makers are also likely to consider the position of
other actors involved in the decision-making process. Since policies often
result from complex negotiations between actors, policy-makers may be unwill-
ing to reopen discussions about them when evaluations recommend to do so
(Weiss 1993: 95), even when they do not object to these recommendations in
principle. In particular, we expect evaluation results not to be used instrumen-
tally if they oppose the preferences of veto players, as policy-makers must always
reckon with the views of actors that can formally block their proposals.
Interest groups are another group of actors whose input may affect evalu-
ation use. Such groups may have no formal veto over policy proposals, but
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they can put pressure on policy-makers to ignore or implement evaluation
results, either directly via lobbying or indirectly via the media. To produce a
policy that satisfies a wide range of actors, policy-makers may prioritize
such interest group preferences over evidence from evaluations (Shulha and
Cousins 1997: 198; Weiss 1993: 95–8).
A further political condition that may affect use is the interest of politicians
and civil servants to protect their financial resources (Johnson et al. 2009: 385;
Weiss 1993: 95). Policy evaluations often recommend budgetary reallocations.
Policy-makers may ignore such evaluation results if they view them as a threat
to their own financial position.
A final relevant political condition is the media coverage of an evaluation
(Weiss 1993, 95). Media coverage can influence the public opinion about
the salience of issues, and issues that are high on the public agenda are
likely to be acted upon. Policy-makers are therefore more likely to pay atten-
tion to and be influenced by evaluations when they have been covered by the
media (Henry and Mark 2003: 303).
Political explanations and the Commission
Although the Commission is officially a neutral institution (Wille 2010: 1098),
research increasingly shows that it (partly) functions as a political actor in
reality (e.g., Hartlapp et al. 2014; Wille 2010: 1100). Concerning evaluations
specifically, the Commission has been shown to ignore results from impact
assessments when this was required by negotiations with the European Par-
liament (EP) and the Council (Torriti 2010: 1078) and to selectively use evi-
dence from programme evaluations that legitimize its pre-existing views
(Boswell 2008: 472). Based on this, we expect political considerations to also
affect the Commission’s use of EPL evaluations. Below we specify how and
to what extent the political conditions discussed above are relevant to
explain the use of EPL evaluations by the Commission.
Policy-makers' preferences are expected to matter in the context of this
article. In our study, the Commission is the only decision-maker, as it has
the sole right of initiative for most EU legislation and is therefore the only
actor to decide about the initial follow-up of EPL evaluations (European Com-
mission 2015: 297–8). We expect the absence of opposing preferences within
the Commission to an evaluation’s recommendations to be a first necessary
condition for use, since the Commission operates on the basis of a political
programme (e.g., Juncker 2014) and may be unwilling to deviate from this
programme when evaluation results contradict it. Since the Commission is
not a unitary actor (Hartlapp et al. 2014: 2), we will consider the preferences
of its two main parts involved in EPL evaluations: the directorate-general
(DG) that manages the evaluation and the Commission’s political top that ulti-
mately decides about legislative proposals.
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The preferences of veto players are also expected to matter for the Commis-
sion, as there are two actors that can block its legislative proposals: the
Council and the EP. The Commission may consider it useless or needlessly pro-
vocative to propose legislation that these institutions oppose, even if an
evaluation recommends this (Torriti 2010: 1078). We therefore expect the
absence of opposition to an evaluation’s recommendations from the EP or
the Council to be a second necessary condition for use.
Interest group preferences may be especially influential in the context of this
article, as the Commission actively consults such groups during most EPL evalu-
ations (European Commission 2015: 280). Existing research shows that interest
groups influence many of the Commission’s decisions, although their success
depends on their resources (Bunea 2013: 567). Whereas it is common that
some interest groups oppose an evaluation’s recommendations, we expect
that the Commission will not implement recommendations that are opposed
by all major interest groups involved in a topic. This makes the absence of
such opposition a third necessary condition for evaluation use.
The interest to protect financial resources is presumably irrelevant for our
study due to our focus on evaluations of legislation (i.e., non-spending activi-
ties). Media coverage is also expected to be unimportant for our study, as
media coverage is generally low for EU policies – outside of some sensitive
policies not discussed in this article (Princen 2011: 940). However, this expec-
tation about media coverage will be tested in our empirical analysis.
Technical conditions
Besides political conditions, the literature about evaluation use also discusses
several technical explanations. ‘Technical’ explanations refer to the quality of
evaluation products and processes. Existing research shows that these factors
influence use because policy-makers only trust evaluation results that they
perceive as robust (Cousins and Leithwood 1986: 358; Johnson et al. 2009:
389; Lederman 2012: 162). Firstly, since evaluations are a form of applied
research, their methodological quality matters (De Laat and William 2014:
158–60; Johnson et al. 2009: 379). Secondly, the credibility of the evaluator is
important: policy-makers put more trust in evaluations published by prac-
titioners with a sufficient reputation (Johnson et al. 2009: 379). Thirdly, an
evaluation’s relevance matters: evaluations are only likely to be used if their
content is required by potential users (Johnson et al. 2009: 379).
Fourthly, stakeholder involvement is important, as policy-makers can be
expected to only trust evaluations that consider the views of actors directly
affected by the legislation (De Laat and William 2014: 165; European Commis-
sion 2015: 280). Finally, communication quality matters: the more an evaluator
stays in contact with an intended user during and after an evaluation process
(preferably informally), the more likely it is that an evaluation’s findings will be
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relevant for the intended user and will therefore be used (Johnson et al. 2009:
379). Thirdly, the timeliness of an evaluation matters, as evaluation results can
only be used if they are available before important decision-making moments
(De Laat and William 2014: 158). As mentioned, these technical conditions will
be controlled for in this study.
Methods
Case selection
Our study is an in-depth analysis of the Commission’s use of three specific EPL
evaluations. Three steps were taken to select these cases out of a dataset of
313 cases (updated version of Mastenbroek et al. 2016: 1335).
Firstly, to select evaluations for which use is likely from a technical perspec-
tive, we only considered cases that meet the criteria for a ‘good’ evaluation
product and process described above. Concerning methodological quality,
we only selected evaluation reports containing a clear operationalization
and problem definition (internal validity), a representative country selection
(external validity) and data triangulation (reliability). Regarding credibility,
only evaluations by consultants who conducted at least five other EPL evalu-
ations for the Commission were considered, as this indicates that the Commis-
sion trusts their work. Concerning relevance, we only selected evaluations that
recommend clear legislative amendments. Regarding stakeholder involve-
ment, we only selected evaluations presenting stakeholder opinions (for
details about these quality criteria, see Mastenbroek et al. 2016: 1335–8).
Secondly, only evaluations published between 2008 and 2012 were con-
sidered. Evaluations from before 2008 were conducted prior to the introduc-
tion of the Commission's evaluation procedures from 2007 (Fitzpatrick 2012:
478), meaning that any findings about such cases would be outdated. For
evaluations published after 2012, it was too likely that decisions concerning
their use had not been made yet.
Thirdly, after intensively scrutinizing the 12 remaining cases, three evalu-
ations were selected. In our first case (the seed and plant propagating material
(S&PM) evaluation), the Commission’s proposal was congruent with all of the
evaluation’s recommendations (high level of use), in our second case (the
Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) evaluation) the Commission’s propo-
sal mostly followed the evaluation’s recommendations (medium level of use)
and in our third selected case (the animal welfare evaluation) the Commission
took no new legislative action at all, even though the evaluation rec-
ommended this (low level of use). The first two cases therefore allow us to
study if the absence of opposition by influential actors is a necessary condition
for use, and if so, to trace the mechanisms behind this effect. If no such causal
relation is found, the comparison with the third case allows us to find other
factors conditioning the Commission’s instrumental use of EPL evaluations.
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The three selected evaluations offered the advantage that they were all
initiated by DG Health and Food Safety (SANTE), so their organizational
context was held constant. The Commission also recognized all three cases
as full evaluations.2 Details about the three selected cases are provided in
the online appendix.
Data collection and analysis
We collected our data via document analysis and semi-structured interviews.
Commission proposals for legislative amendments (if available) were studied
along with any documents leading up to them. Such documents usually
included (1) an action plan based on the evaluation’s results, (2) a roadmap
for legislative reform, (3) a report on stakeholder consultations, (4) an ‘incep-
tion impact assessment’ about the expected consequences of policy options
and (5) a legislative proposal together with the final impact assessment (IA)
(European Commission 2015: 297–306). The document analysis allowed us
to identify which of the evaluations’ suggestions had been followed up by
the Commission and which suggestions it had dropped at what moment.
Detailed explanations for these decisions were subsequently gathered via
interviews, as we required open questions and follow-up questions to deter-
mine the preferences of various actors. To avoid the risk of socially desirable
answers we interviewed a broad variety of respondents and guaranteed their
anonymity.
In total, we conducted 19 interviews, when possible face-to-face (eight cases)
and when necessary by phone (nine cases) or e-mail (two cases). For each case,
we spoke to the Commission’s civil servant who had coordinated the evalu-
ation. Regarding the animal welfare evaluation, we also spoke to the Commis-
sion’s Secretariat-General (SG), as other interviews showed it had been involved
in this case. Additionally, for each case, we interviewed two respondents from
different parties in the EP and two external stakeholders that had provided
input for each evaluation and that represented significantly different interests
(respectively small seed producers and large seed producers, consumer organ-
izations and national consumer authorities (NCAs), and animal welfare NGOs
and farmers). We did not interview the Council, as this actor did not finish dis-
cussing our second and third case at the time of writing. For each case, we also
interviewed one of the consultants that conducted the evaluation.
Operationalization
Instrumental evaluation use, our outcome variable, refers to the consideration
and implementation of an evaluation’s recommendations by its intended user
to improve policies (Cousins and Leithwood 1986: 346). Therefore, we
checked during the interviews if the Commission (the intended user) had con-
sidered the evaluation’s recommendations when deciding about future
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policies. Furthermore, for each major legislative amendment recommended
by the three evaluations, we checked via both document analysis and inter-
views if any subsequent legislative proposal from the Commission
implemented this change. To limit our article’s scope, recommendations
about legislative implementation or minor clarifications to legislation were
ignored.
Concerning the political explanatory conditions, the Commission’s policy pre-
ferences were measured by asking our respondents what amendments to the
evaluated legislation the Commission considered necessary before and after
the evaluation was conducted. Also, for each of the major recommendations
identified, we checked if it was controversial for the parts of the Commission
involved in the evaluation’s follow-up (the managing DG and the Commission’s
political top) and if/how this had affected the evaluation’s use.
Concerning veto player preferences and interest group preferences, respon-
dents were asked to what extent each recommendation was in line with
the views of the EP, the Council and major interest groups and how the Com-
mission had reckoned with these views in its decisions. ‘Major interest groups’
were defined as collectives of interests (like producers and consumers) that
were consulted during the evaluation. We checked the views stated by
respondents with official documents when possible.
Concerning media coverage, respondents were asked if the evaluation was
covered by any mainstream media up until the Commission’s decision about
proposing amendments. Additionally, we analysed if the evaluations were
covered by Politico/European Voice.3 Finally, respondents were asked if other
factors had influenced the evaluation’s use.
Our assessment of the evaluations’ technical quality was checked by asking
the respondents to judge the internal validity (absence of systematic errors),
external validity (generalizability), reliability (absence of coincidental errors)
and relevance of the final evaluation report, plus the credibility of the evalua-
tor and the extent to which stakeholders had been involved. The timeliness of
the evaluation was mapped by asking respondents if the evaluation was avail-
able to all relevant actors within the Commission when it decided about leg-
islative amendments (Swanborn 2007: 323). Communication quality was
operationalized by asking respondents how often the evaluator had in-
depth contact with the Commission during the evaluation process and if infor-
mal contact was also possible (Swanborn 2007: 324).
Results
Below we first present the assessment of our technical conditions. We then
show how each of our cases ‘scored’ on the political conditions identified
above. After summarizing our results at the end of this section, we proceed
with an in-depth analysis.
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Technical controls
Almost all respondents who remembered the evaluations in detail confirmed
that they observed high standards of validity, reliability, the credibility of the
evaluator, relevance and stakeholder involvement. The sole exception was the
S&PM evaluation: some respondents believed that this evaluation lacked data
about small seed producers (interview 1A, 1D) and/or contained some ambig-
uous recommendations (interview 1A, 1B). However, these remarks only con-
cerned some specific elements of the evaluation and other respondents did
not support these criticisms (interview 1B, 1E).
Concerning timeliness, the interviews confirmed that all the evaluations
were available to the Commission before it decided about legislative amend-
ments. Regarding communication quality, in all three cases, there was frequent
formal and informal contact between the Commission and the evaluator.
These results confirm that the use of our three evaluations was not
impeded by lacking quality.
Furthermore, none of the respondents believed that the results of the
evaluations were changed significantly due to pressure from the Commission.
The fact that the respondents were promised anonymity and that many of
them moved to new jobs since the evaluations were completed lends some
credibility to these claims, although we cannot exclude that the Commission
may have subtly influenced the evaluations’ findings.
Case description 1: S&PM evaluation
The EU’s 12 directives on seed and plant propagating material (S&PM legis-
lation) set the criteria that plant varieties must meet before they may be
placed on the European market. The legislation aims to level the playing
field for seed producers and to improve agricultural productivity by requiring
the registration of plant varieties in national and European catalogues. This in
turn requires varieties to meet standards on Distinctness, Uniformity and Stab-
ility (DUS-criteria) and, in the case of agricultural crops species, standards on
Value for Cultivation and Use (VCU-criteria). Furthermore, the legislation
requires national authorities to inspect the quality of individual S&PM lots
(Arcadia International et al. 2008: 25–6).
As a part of the Commission’s Better Regulation Agenda, the EU’s S&PM
legislation was evaluated in 2008 to suggest how its effectiveness and efficiency
could be improved (Arcadia International et al. 2008: 2). Table 1 lists the evalu-
ation’s eight recommendations for major amendments and shows which sub-
sequent Commission documents included plans to implement them.
The S&PM evaluation represents a high level of use. Respondents from
both the Commission and other organizations confirmed that the Commis-
sion took the evaluation’s findings seriously when deciding about the
374 S. VAN VOORST AND P. ZWAAN
future of the S&PM legislation (interview 1A, 1B, 1E). Table 1 also shows
that the Commission followed up almost all of the evaluation’s recommen-
dations in its legislative proposal (COM(2013)262) and the preceding docu-
ments. Only recommendations 3 and 8 were ignored in some of these
documents, but they were addressed through delegated acts (European Com-
mission 2013: 5, 34).
Concerning the Commission’s policy preferences, the Commission already
perceived the need to amend the S&PM legislation before the evaluation
took place, as member states had notified it of various problems (like
lacking harmonization) with the existing directives (interview 1A, 1B).
However, according to respondents representing the Commission and the
evaluator, the Commission did not have strong preferences about how the
legislation should be amended (interview 1A, 1B). The Commission viewed
Table 1. Follow-up of the recommendations of the S&PM and the CPC evaluation.
Note: Grey cells indicate that proposals to implement the recommendations were included in the
document.
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the legislative process as a technical matter, using the evaluation to identify
potential policy improvements (interview 1A). One other respondent slightly
disagreed with this and stated that the Commission had preferences in line
with recommendations 1 and 7 before the evaluation was conducted, but
mainly because these solutions had already been suggested by stakeholders
(interview 1E).
Concerning veto player preferences, the EP viewed the Commission’s legis-
lative proposal as too beneficial for large seed companies and rejected it in
March 2014 (e.g., resolution A7-0112/2014). On the other hand, the Council
generally supported the Commission’s views. Some countries (like France)
objected to replacing twelve directives on different products with one regu-
lation, but overall there was little controversy among the member states
(interview 1A, 1B, 1E).
Concerning interest group preferences, large seed producers generally sup-
ported the legislative proposal (interview 1D, 1E). However, many NGOs repre-
senting small and biological seed producers criticized the proposal for how it
handled recommendation 2. Most of these NGOs wanted the DUS-criteria to
be abolished altogether for niche market seeds (interview 1A, 1B, 1D, 1E).
Whereas the Commission’s proposal allowed such seeds to be recognized as ‘offi-
cially recognized descriptions’ to which the DUS-criteria would not apply, the
NGOs viewed the criteria and procedures to apply for this exception as too
demanding and opposed the existence of any compulsory registration of niche
market seeds on principle (interview 1A, 1D, 1E; IFOAM EU Group 2013: 6–11).
The interviews and the media analysis showed that media coverage was
entirely absent for this evaluation.
Case description 2: CPC evaluation
The EU’s CPC Regulation 2006/2004 aims to enhance the enforcement of
certain European consumer protection legislation (as listed in the regulation’s
annex) by increasing cooperation among NCAs. For this purpose, the regu-
lation establishes mechanisms through which NCA’s can request each
other’s assistance, including an IT platform for posting alerts. The regulation
also establishes the minimum powers that national authorities must have to
be able to assist each other. Furthermore, the regulation creates a European
network that coordinates the activities of NCAs (the CPC network) (ICF GHK
et al. 2012: 4).
Article 21a of the regulation states that it must be evaluated after five years.
Accordingly, an external evaluation of the regulation was completed in 2012,
which produced seven recommendations concerning major amendments
(ICF GHK et al. 2012: 6–18). Table 1 lists these recommendations and shows
which subsequent Commission documents included plans for their
implementation.
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The CPC evaluation represents a medium level of instrumental use. All
respondents believe that the Commission seriously considered the evalu-
ation’s results when deciding about possible amendments (interview 2A–
2E). The legislative proposal published by the Commission in May 2016
(COM(2016)283) ignored the final two recommendations listed above, but
included plans to implement the other five.
Concerning the Commission’s policy preferences, the interviews showed that
recommendations 1 and 3 were longstanding priorities of the Commission, as
it viewed more coordinated European action as necessary to protect consu-
mers throughout the internal market. However, the Commission did not
have strong preferences regarding the other evaluation results (interview
2C, 2E).
Concerning veto player preferences, the EP supported most of the evalu-
ation’s recommendations as being helpful to enhance consumer protection
(e.g., resolution A8-0077/2017). However, both the EP and the Council put
forward amendments to remove the Commission’s right to initiate infringe-
ments (recommendation 1), as this proposal was viewed as threatening to
national sovereignty. Most member states also opposed the proposed expan-
sion of minimum powers (recommendation 3), as these powers may be diffi-
cult to handle for smaller NCAs. Furthermore, many countries opposed the
content of some proposed minimum powers (like forcing infringers to com-
pensate consumers) because legally moving these powers to their NCAs
would be costly for them (interview 2B, 2C, 2E).
Concerning interest group preferences, consumer associations supported all
the evaluation’s recommendations because they viewed them as beneficial
for consumer protection (BEUC 2016). Business associations only objected
to the proposed minimum powers to shut down websites. Our media analysis
and the interviews revealed that the evaluation received almost nomedia cov-
erage (interview 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E).
Case description 3: animal welfare evaluation
Legislation is one of the EU’s instruments to improve animal welfare.
Various European directives protect cattle and experimental animals, for
example by banning unfriendly farming methods and regulating space
allowances, but most other animal types are not covered by existing EU
legislation.
In 2006 the Commission published its first animal welfare strategy. In the
context of this strategy, an external evaluation of the entire EU animal
welfare policy was completed in 2010. Our research only concerns the part
of the evaluation about legislation, which recommended to consider expand-
ing the scope of EU animal welfare legislation to protect all animal species
(GHK and ADAS UK 2010: 6).
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The Commission (2012: 6) followed up on the evaluation with a second
animal welfare strategy, which stated that the possibility of new animal
welfare legislation should be considered in 2014. Respondents confirmed
that DG SANTE took the evaluation seriously when drafting this strategy
and that it would have been willing to take different decisions if the evalu-
ation’s results had recommended this (interview 3A, 3D).
However, when DG SANTE prepared an early draft of a legislative proposal in
2014 it was informed by the SG that the proposal should wait until a new Com-
mission would enter office in November. After this happened, the SG told DG
SANTE that the existing animal welfare strategy should be fully implemented
before new animal welfare legislation could be considered (even though one
aspect of this strategy was considering new legislation) (interview 3A, 3D).
Most respondents therefore believe the implementation of the evaluation’s rec-
ommendation to be blocked by the SG (interview 3A, 3C, 3D, 3E), although the
SG states that no such decision was formally taken (interview 3F).
Concerning the Commission’s policy preferences, the animal welfare unit of
DG SANTE always supported further measures to improve animal welfare,
including legislation. At the top of DG SANTE and in the SG animal welfare
legislation was never considered a priority, but there was little active opposi-
tion to the idea either before 2014 (interview 3A, 3D).
Concerning veto player preferences, both the interviews and various resol-
utions (e.g., A7-0216/2012) show that the EP strongly supports stricter
animal welfare legislation (interview 3A, 3C, 3D). The Council is more
divided about the topic, with countries in North(western) Europe generally
supporting new legislation and some countries with much agriculture (e.g.,
Greece) opposing it.
Concerning interest group preferences, farmer associations opposed new
animal welfare legislation because it could lead to additional costs. Animal
rights groups were also sceptical about the idea of an integrated animal
welfare law, as they feared it would include more self-regulation and no stric-
ter welfare standards (interview 3D, 3E). Our interviews and media analysis
revealed that there was virtually no media coverage of the evaluation.
Summary of the cross-case comparison
Table 2 summarizes the three cases and their ‘scores’ on the explanatory con-
ditions. The CPC case has been split into two groups of recommendations that
differ in their level of use; in the other cases, the level of use of the recommen-
dations was relatively similar.
Our theoretical framework predicted that the absence of opposition to
an evaluation’s recommendations from the Commission, the EP, the
Council and major interest groups would be a necessary condition for
use. However, as Table 2 shows this is not the case. The S&PM and CPC
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evaluations are two cases where the Commission implemented respectively
all and many recommendations in a legislative proposal, despite significant
opposition from respectively the EP plus interest groups and the Council.
The results do confirm our expectation that media coverage was absent
in all cases.
To explain these findings, the next section zooms in on the steps in the
follow-up process of each evaluation when specific recommendations were
included in or discarded from the Commission’s plans. For the first two
cases, this allows us to see why the predicted mechanisms were not triggered
and if other causes can explain their outcomes instead. Our analysis of the
third evaluation allows us to see if similar mechanisms can play a role in
cases with low instrumental use.
Analysis
Case analysis 1: S&PM evaluation
As described above, the S&PM evaluation was entirely followed up by the
Commission despite opposition from the EP and various NGOs regarding
the topic of niche markets. To explain this, we must consider the Commis-
sion’s contact with these actors throughout the follow-up process. DG
SANTE’s communication with the EP was mostly handled by its top-level
civil servants, while the details about the evaluation’s follow-up were
decided by its plant health unit. This unit received positive feedback on its
plans from the member states via the comitology system, but had no
contact with the EP. Accordingly, it was surprised when the proposal was
rejected by the EP in 2014 (interview 1A, 1C, 1E). Therefore, the mechanism
linking opposition by the EP to non-use that we predicted was not triggered.
The upcoming elections of May 2014 and a critical lobby by NGOs repre-
senting small seed producers and biological farmers both contributed to
the proposal’s rejection by the EP (interview 1A, 1B, 1C, 1E). The Commission’s
plant health unit had been in contact with these NGOs during the follow-up
Table 2. Overview of results.
Evaluation
Level
of use
View of
Commission
on results
View of EP
on results
View of
Council on
results
Interest
groups
views
Media
coverage
S&PM evaluation High No strong
opinion
Generally
opposed
Generally in
favour
Divided Absent
CPC evaluation:
recommendations
1–5
High Generally in
favour
Generally
in favour
Generally
opposed
In favour Absent
CPC evaluation:
recommendations
6–7
Low No strong
opinion
No strong
opinion
No strong
opinion
In favour Absent
Animal welfare
evaluation
Low In favour Generally
in favour
Divided Generally
opposed
Absent
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process of the evaluation and had, as mentioned in the case description,
made some concessions to their views. However, in general, the unit
wished to base its proposal on the evaluation and other evidence, which it
felt the NGOs did not provide. The Commission also expected that the
NGOs would support the proposal in the end because it would be better
for them than no change at all (interview 1A). Whereas some NGOs did
indeed take this position, others opposed the amendments on principle
(interview 1D). In conclusion, the Commission did not reckon with political
opposition from the EP and significant interest groups because it was rela-
tively unaware of the former and it (falsely) thought it could pacify the latter.
The Commission could have relaunched the proposal after its rejection, as
some further concessions to the NGOs and the EP may have increased its
chances (interview 1A, 1E). However, this option was complicated by the
fact that seed legislation had no direct link to the priorities of the new
Juncker Commission (the economy, human rights, migration) (Juncker
2014). Strict procedural requirements would therefore apply to any new pro-
posal (e.g., a new IA would need to be produced), for which the plant health
unit does not currently have the resources (interview 1A, 1C).
Case analysis 2: CPC evaluation
As described above, most of the recommendations of the CPC evaluation
were implemented in a legislative proposal from the Commission despite sig-
nificant opposition from especially the Council. As one respondent stated, the
Commission’s proposal was ‘highly ambitious’ because it deliberately ignored
objections from the member states (interview 2C). The explanation for this is
that the Juncker Commission considered consumer protection a key priority
to encourage the European economy (Juncker 2014: 6). When this Commis-
sion entered office it dropped many nearly completed legislative proposals
to demonstrate its commitment to its Better Regulation Agenda, but the
fledgling CPC proposal continued because it was considered a high priority
(interview 2C, 2E).
Conversely, Table 2 also shows that the last two recommendations of the
CPC evaluation were ignored by the Commission despite not going against
the preferences of any influential actors. How can this be explained? Rec-
ommendation 6 (creating an observatory) was still mentioned by the Commis-
sion’s documents in mid-2014, but had been dropped by October 2015
(during which period the Juncker Commission entered office). This change
was solely caused by budgetary reasons: unlike most other recommendations
of EPL evaluations, establishing an observatory would cost much manpower
to implement. The Juncker Commission had to reduce its civil service from
the outset, and any remaining extra capacity for consumer protection was
envisaged to be spent on the Commission’s increased role in the CPC
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network (interview 2A, 2B, 2C). This situation appears to be a rare case where
the interest to protect financial resources, which we predicted to be unimpor-
tant in our theoretical framework, does affect the use of EPL evaluations.
Recommendation 7 was not followed up because the Commission
considered it to be contradictory: the evaluation first states that the objectives
of the regulation must be clarified, but then states that its current objectives
are ‘appropriate and relevant’ (interview 2A). Other respondents also read this
recommendation in various ways, confirming its indistinctness (interview 2B,
2C, 2E).
In conclusion, the fact that some recommendations of the CPC evaluation
were not followed up by the Commission is best explained by their excep-
tional characteristics rather than by any fundamental opposition from political
actors. Conversely, the recommendations that were relatively controversial
have all been followed up because the Juncker Commission viewed them
as essential to its political priorities.
Case analysis 3: animal welfare evaluation
As was discussed above, the animal welfare evaluation’s recommendation to
consider legislative changes was not followed up in the end, despite the fact
that it was supported by the responsible Commission DG and the EP. Based on
Table 2, an intuitive explanation for this lack of use seems to lie in the opposi-
tion of various member states and interest groups.
However, for three reasons, none of the respondents believe that this
opposition was influential. Firstly, the idea of new animal welfare legislation
was blocked by the SG in 2014, while member states and interest groups
only seem to have lobbied about this topic at the DG-level during that time
(interview 3D, 3E, 3F). Secondly, various respondents believe that an inte-
grated animal welfare law could have been ‘sold’ to sceptical countries if it
had been presented as a simplification effort, with controversial discussions
about stricter welfare standards being moved to the comitology system (inter-
view 3A, 3B, 3D). Thirdly, all interest groups state that they were much sur-
prised when the idea of new animal welfare legislation was dropped in late
2014 (interview 3D, 3E).
So what does explain the lack of use of the animal welfare evaluation? As in
the two other cases, the answer lies in the Juncker Commission’s tendency to
focus on its political priorities: the economy, human rights and migration
(Juncker 2014; interview 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, 3E). To demonstrate its commitment
to its Better Regulation Agenda, the Commission dropped many proposals
that had no link to these topics, including the draft proposal for new
animal welfare legislation (interview 3C, 3D).
In conclusion, the choice not to propose new animal welfare legislation had
less to do with political preferences concerning the specific topic andmore with
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general shifts in the Commission’s priorities, although according to some
respondents the fact that animal welfare was already considered relatively
unimportant by the top of DG SANTE and the SG may also have contributed
(interview 3A, 3D). The evaluation could not change this situation, as such
reports are almost never read at the top of the Commission (interview 3F).
Conclusion
This article started with the question to what extent and how political con-
ditions affect the European Commission’s instrumental use of EPL evaluations.
Based on nineteen in-depth interviews and extensive document analysis, we
traced possible reasons for variation in the levels of use of three evaluations
that were all of high technical quality.
Our expectation that the absence of opposition to an evaluation’s rec-
ommendations from major political actors is a necessary condition for their
use by the Commission was falsified by our findings. In our first two cases,
the Commission implemented all or most of the evaluations’ recommen-
dations, despite significant opposition from actors like the EP, interest
groups and the Council. In the first case, the Commission was unaware of
the EP’s opposition and falsely thought it could pacify interest groups with
concessions; in the second case, the Commission considered legislative
changes too important to reckon with the Council’s opposition. In our third
case, opposition to the evaluation’s findings from interest groups and the
Council hardly seemed to have influenced the Commission’s decision to
ignore its results.
Instead, we found that a lack of salience of the policy field to which an EPL
evaluation belongs in the eyes of the current (Juncker) Commission appears to
be a sufficient condition for non-use. In other words, if the evaluated legis-
lation has no direct relation to one of the Commission’s priorities, the insti-
tution is reluctant to propose amendments even when an evaluation
recommends this. Our second case fits well with the Commission’s economic
priorities and therefore received a legislative proposal, whereas our third case
did not and therefore received no follow-up. In our first case, a legislative pro-
posal was already dropped before Juncker entered into office, but attempts to
relaunch this proposal were also hindered by the fact that seed legislation is
no political priority.
What do these findings imply about the instrumental use of EPL evaluation
in the Commission and in general? As our theoretical section explained, the
existing literature on instrumental evaluation use (in the Commission and in
general) describes various political factors which may impede such use, like
the prevalence of pre-existing policy beliefs and the need to safeguard com-
promises. However, this existing literature pays little attention to the fact that
political actors may also have a symbolic interest to reduce their policy output.
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Since EPL evaluations often recommend changing legislation to improve it,
they essentially request policy-makers to frequently propose legislative
amendments. In the case of the Commission, such recommendations contra-
dict its plans to propose little legislation outside of its priority fields. This con-
tradiction leads to reduced possibilities for evaluation use.
Our findings suggest that this political interest to limit legislative proposals
should be considered when studying the Commission’s instrumental use of
evidence. As national executives may also commit themselves to limit their
legislative output in the context of better regulation agendas, this condition
may also be relevant for explaining other policy-makers’ use of EPL
evaluations.
Our study has two noteworthy limitations. Firstly, due to our focus on the
Commission, we did not systematically assess the wider impact of EPL evalu-
ations on legislative outcomes. Our first case showed that even when EPL
evaluations affect the Commission’s legislative proposals, they may not influ-
ence the final outcomes of EU legislative processes, as NGOs and other actors
that disagree with evaluation results may still lobby against proposals based
on them at the Council or EP. For future research, a more in-depth assessment
of such processes would be recommended.
A second limitation lies in our case selection. Since we only studied
high-quality evaluations, our conclusions may not apply to evaluations
that fail to meet certain technical standards. Furthermore, because we
only studied evaluations from DG SANTE the representativeness of our
results could be limited, even though the selected cases covered a wide
range of policies. For future research, it is therefore recommended to use
a larger number of cases to study whether a lack of salience combined
with a commitment to reduce legislative output is indeed a sufficient con-
dition for non-use.
Notes
1. Other types of use often mentioned in the literature are accountability use, con-
ceptual use and strategic use. Because these types of use may be driven by
different factors than instrumental use, they are not considered in this article.
For a study about the accountability use of EPL evaluations, see Zwaan et al.
(2016).
2. The Commission classified three cases that met all our criteria as ‘studies’ instead
of EPL evaluations. These cases were dropped to avoid unnecessary discussions
about terminology.
3. The following keywords were entered in the search engine of Politico (which also
shows the results for articles of European Voice) at https://www.politico.eu/: ‘seed
marketing’, ‘plant seeds’ and ‘plant propagating’ (S&PM case), ‘consumer protec-
tion’ (CPC case) and ‘animal welfare’ (animal welfare case). We searched for the
entire period of time between the initiation of the evaluation and either the leg-
islative proposal or the decision not to propose legislation.
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